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Many of our apparently insoluble current tax problems were born in the original sin
of sloppy thinking about defining income at a time when it was the subject of only a
minor tax. Unfortunately, as the tax became major, its original sins resisted
baptism. . . . The double taxation of corporate dividends can certainly be
attributed to sloppy thinking about the relation of corporations and their
shareholders under the income tax. 1
I. Introduction.
The United States has long followed the so-called classical
system of corporate equity taxation. Earnings of the corporation
are taxed once at the corporate level and after-tax earnings of
the corporation are generally subject to a second shareholder
level tax. The shareholder tax may be levied close in time to
the corporate level tax as in a dividend distribution made from
current earnings and profits. Alternatively, the corporation may
retain its after-tax earnings for a extended period resulting in
stock value appreciation. The shareholder level tax is thus
deferred until such time as the shareholder realizes a capital
gain on sale or exchange of the appreciated stock.
In 1981, Professor Alvin C. Warren, Jr. 2 declared in a
Harvard Law Review article that "The time has come . . . for the
development of a complete legislative proposal for integration of
Brannon, Tax Loopholes as Original Sin: Lessons from Tax History, 31
Vill. L. Rev. 1763, 1766, 1780 (1986) (rejecting the view of many commentators
that the structural problems with our tax system are the result of lading it
at political gunpoint with an assortment of illogical special interest
provisions)
.
2Professor, Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

the individual and corporate income taxes. It would be
regrettable if the American Law Institute . . . were not a full
participant in the debate . . . . " 3 Twelve years later, despite
substantial scholarly debate, discussion in non-legal mainstream
periodicals4 , and general acceptance of corporate integration as
a good thing in the abstract, the United States is no closer to
implementation of any integration system than it was in 1981.
On March 31, 1993, the American Law Institute released the
238-page final version of Reporter's Study of Corporate Tax
Integration5 in which Professor Warren (as Reporter) recommends
adoption of a shareholder credit integration system. While
Professor Warren bases his discussion of the defects of the
classical system of corporate taxation and the various systems of
integration in large part on his 1981 Harvard Law Review article,
the remainder of the Reporter's Study is noteworthy for its
concrete proposals and detailed examination of the issues that
Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income
Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 719, 800 (1981).
See, e.g., Norton, Our Screwed-Op Tax Code, Fortune Magazine, September
6, 1993, at 34, 40-44 (cover story bemoaning double taxation of corporate
earnings and citing integration systems of Germany, Britain, France and Japan
as creating a more hospitable business environment); Boskin, A Better Way to
Tackle the Deficit, Fortune Magazine, September 6, 1993, at 46 (promoting
integration as one way to increase investment, income, wealth and jobs);
Warsh, On Avoiding Stewed Frogs, Boston Globe, March 12, 1989 at Al; Brookes,
Bad Tax Policy Boosts Debt, Nation's Business, January, 1990 at 77(1).
Warren, American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project, Integration
of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, Reporter's Study of Corporate
Tax Integration, Final Version (1993) (co-Reporter, Professor William D.
Andrews, Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts) [hereinafter
cited as ALI Reporter's Study].

would have to be addressed in designing a shareholder credit
integration system.
This article is intended as a critical review of the ALI
Reporter's Study. While I discuss each of the Study's proposals
at least briefly, I have intentionally limited my review to the
domestic aspects of Professor Warren's integration system. I
have thus ignored international considerations except as they
relate preliminarily to the choice of integration systems.
I conclude that the ALI Reporter's Study is an important
addition to the extensive body of literature extant on the
subject of corporate integration6 . Professor Warren largely
succeeds in achieving the stated objective of the ALI Reporter's
Study: " [T]o develop proposals that provide as complete a
response as possible to the defects of current law by converting
the corporate tax into a withholding device." 7 However, while
the Study's description of the mechanics of the shareholder
credit integration system is technically top-notch, it fails to
offer compelling proof that integration is necessary. Similarly,
the Study inadequately explains its preference for the
shareholder credit integration method. The Study also fails to
adequately explain the reason integration has not been
See generally extensive bibliographies found in the ALI Reporter's
Study, supra note 5, at 223-238; in U. S. Treasury Department, Report on
Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems — Taxing Business
Income Once (1992) at 253-266 [hereinafter cited as Treasury Report]; and in
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Tax Division,
Statement of Tax Policy 10: Integration of the Corporate and Shareholder Tax
Systems at 97-99 (1993) [hereinafter cited as AICPA Report].
7ALI Reporters Study, supra, note 5, at 2.

implemented in the United States despite initiatives during every
Administration in the last twenty years. 8 Lastly, the Study's
undervaluation of the political dimension of the integration
debate and its failure to adeguately address second order effects
significantly detracts from the deference the Study would
otherwise receive. In short, the ALI Reporter's Study is
noteworthy but is not a "complete legislative proposal" nor is it
likely to spark abandonment of the classical system any time
soon.
II. "Do No Harm"
Professor Warren offers two reasons for undertaking the ALI
Reporter's Study. First, he notes that the classical system has
long been roundly criticized for distorting financial decision-
making with many critics offering integration as a panacea for
correcting all that ails the classical system. Second, he notes
the recent movement of many industrialized nations toward
integration and suggests that the U.S. could be placed at a
See, e.g., Treasury Department, Tax Reform For Fairness, Simplicity,
and Economic Growth (November, 1984) (50% dividends paid deduction); Treasury
Department, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977) (shareholder allocation
method); Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate
Income Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 719, 793 (1981) (Carter Treasury Dept developed
an imputation integration proposal that was never released to the public but
which was discussed at a Brookings Institution conference in 1977); H. Res.
5300 (House passed a 10% dividends paid deduction in legislation leading to
enactment of TRA 1986; provision was dropped during joint conference);
Treasury Report, supra note 6; Treasury Department, A Recommendation for
Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems (December 1992),
reprinted in Daily Tax Report (BNA), Dec. 14, 1992, at L-7 (dividend exclusion
method) [hereinafter cited as Treasury Recommendation].

competitive disadvantage. 9 This conjunction of international
trade concerns with the familiar economic arguments against the
classical system makes U.S. integration more compelling than
ever. 10
While the defects of the classical system and the adoption
of integrated tax systems by many of our trading partners are
well-documented, it does not necessarily follow that integration
is right for the United States. While many commentators have
advocated integration to remedy the distortions of the classical
system, the tide of opinion running against integration is
arguably just as strong. 11 As to the international dimension,
one must bear in mind that the case for integration is much
stronger in most other industrialized nations because of their
generally higher corporate and individual tax rates. 12
Legislators should decide to integrate only after an exhaustive
assessment finds that integration on balance is right for the
United States. Integrating our domestic tax system must be based
on reasons more substantial than a desire for lemming-like
conformity in the interest of simplifying tax treaty
qCompare AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 11, n. 19 ("There appears to be
no empirical evidence to support the conclusion that adoption of an





ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 1-2; accord Treasury Report,
supra note 6, at ix.
See infra text accompanying notes 137-167.
12Sheppard, Good Times, Bad Times: Business Tax Developments In the Last
20 Years, 57 Tax Notes 840, 841 (November 12, 1992).

negotiations. The ALI Reporter's Study fails to offer convincing
proof that the disease is worse than the cure.
Simply noting that the classical system of taxation distorts
financial decision-making does not a fortiori prove the need for
integration since any tax levy is inherently distortionary as
compared to a world free of such tax. Accepting the proffered
distortions as true, integration can only be worthwhile if it can
be shown (1) that integration will reduce or eliminate the
distortions of the classical system; (2) that reduction or
elimination of the distortions is best achieved by integration;
and (3) that integration will not result in second-order effects
even more deleterious than those sought to be removed from the
classical system. While the ALI Reporter's Study capably shows
that integration can reduce or eliminate many distortions of the
classical system, it does not adequately address other remedies
or second order effects of integration.
III. Distortions of the Classical System of Corporate Taxation
The ALI Reporter's Study indicts the classical system of
double taxation for placing a heavier burden on U.S. corporate
equity investment as compared to other forms of business
investment. It identifies four major distortions that the
integration literature generally accepts as axiomatic and that I
accept as true for purposes of this critique.

First, the heavier relative burden discourages individuals
from investing in corporate eguity. 13 The double taxation of
corporate source income may result in a misallocation of
resources toward the noncorporate business sector to the
detriment of corporate sector investment. 14 This bias against
corporate equity investment results in decreased investment in
capital-intensive activities whose large start up costs can only
be financed by use of corporate form. 15 The double tax on
corporate source income has been linked with decreased national
savings and thus may retard capital accumulation and economic
growth. 16 The double tax bite also may discourage foreign
investment in the United States and hamper our ability to strike




Second, the classical system encourages corporations to fund
new projects using debt or retained earnings as opposed to new
13ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 3, 22-25; see also Treasury
Report, supra note 6, at 3-4; Break and Pechman, Federal Tax Reform: The
Impossible Dream?, 91-92 (1975); AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 3.
14ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 42; see also Treasury Report,
supra note 6, at 3-4 (total effective federal income tax rate on corporate
equity is 48% compared to 28% for noncorporate investment)
.
AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 15; Break and Pechman, supra note 13,
at 95. Break and Pechman also suggest that there may be a misallocation of
resources within the corporate sector since the crazy quilt of corporate tax
preferences has resulted in wide variance in the effective rate of tax paid by
corporations. They also note that corporations that historically pay out a
high percentage of their earnings (e.g., utilities) are particularly burdened
by the classical system.
16AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 15-16.
17,Cheney, Call for an Integrated Tax System, 59 Tax Notes 1820, 1821
(June 28, 1993).

equity. 18 The tax bias toward debt financing stems from the
corporate deduction for interest paid and may undermine the
financial health of corporations and increase the risk of
bankruptcy. 19 The tendency of corporate managers to rely on debt
or retained earnings places an unconscious, artificial ceiling on
the amount of corporate capital expenditures. This psychological
barrier can discourage corporations from pursuing capital-
intensive opportunities that absent tax considerations would
provide the best return on capital and encourage them instead to
pursue service sector projects with low financing requirements.
Third, the classical system may encourage corporations to
retain rather than distribute earnings. 20 When the corporate tax
rate is less than the applicable individual rate, retention of
earnings enables shareholders to mitigate the double tax bite
through three capital gain preference mechanisms. They can avoid
immediate taxation at the shareholder level by retention of
earnings within the corporation. Retained earnings will result
in increased share prices with shareholder taxation deferred
18ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 3, 25-28; see also Treasury
Report, supra note 6, at 4, 6 (total effective federal income tax rate on
corporate debt is 20% versus 48% for corporate equity) ; Break and Pechman,
supra note 13, at 95; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 3. Compare Halperin,
Commentary: Will Integration Increase Efficiency?—The Old and New View of
Dividend Policy, Colloquium on Corporate Tax Integration, 47 Tax L. Rev. 645,
646 (1992) (reporting comment of Professor Shuldiner that "market limitations
on the amount of debt that can be issued might make the debt/equity problem
less serious than it appears").
19ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 42; see Treasury Report, supra
note 6, at 4; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 14.
20ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 3, 28-39; see Treasury Report,
supra note 6, at vii, 3; Break and Pechman, supra note 13, at 91-92; AICPA
Report, supra note 6, at 3.
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until disposition of the stock (deferral effect) . When the stock
is sold, the shareholder may be taxed at a preferred capital
gains rate (exclusion effect) . If the shareholder holds the
stock until death, the second tax bite is avoided forever by
virtue of the IRC Section 1014 stepped-up basis provision
(succession effect)
.
21 Retention of earnings at the corporate
level is undesirable because the corporation may not be the best
place for new investment by shareholders. If corporations paid
out all their earnings and raised new capital through equity
financing, corporate decision-making would be subjected to the
test of the marketplace. 22
Fourth, for a corporation that has decided to distribute its
earnings to shareholders, the classical system encourages
corporations to prefer nondividend distributions over dividend
distributions. 23 Nondividend distributions become particularly
attractive when the spread between individual ordinary income and
capital gains rates is large. While the ability of corporations
to obtain exchange treatment for their shareholders is subject to
some restrictions24
,
those restrictions have not dampened
corporate enthusiasm for nondividend distributions, particularly
21 •McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The
Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 537, 538
(1975).
Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration: The Proper Way to Eliminate the
Corporate Tax, 27 Tax Notes 637, 638 (May 6, 1985).
23ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 3, 39-40.
24See IRC §305(b)(2), (c), applicable to distributions made after
January 10, 1969.

share repurchases. 25 Corporate use of nondividend distributions
as a tax-avoidance mechanism results in controversy between
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service and enforcement is
both expensive and administratively difficult. 26
While the ALI Reporter's Study is on solid ground in its
listing of the major economic distortions of the classical
system, the Study then makes the startling assertion that " [e]ven
if the existing system did not cause undesirable distortions in
behavior, the distinctions created by current law would warrant
legislative change because they have proven exceedingly difficult
. . . to apply in practice." 27 While distinctions such as those
between debt versus equity and redemption versus dividend
certainly place a premium on tax planning and result in
uncertainty and litigation28 , I am aware of no other commentator
who would argue that the high cost of administering the classical
system alone is reason enough to pursue integration.
The ALI Reporter's Study states "[t]he tax-induced
distortions of current law are undesirable to the extent they
have deleterious economic effects (such as overreliance on debt
25See generally Treasury Report, supra note 6, at vii, 4-5, 10-11 (25.5%
of net interest paid by nonfinancial corporations in 1990 attributable to debt
financing of share repurchases; "[s]hare repurchases increased substantially
from 1970 to 1990, growing from $1.2 billion (or 5.4 percent of dividends) to
$47.9 billion (or 34 percent of dividends) . . . ."); Break and Pechman, supra
note 13, at 91-92.
26AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 3, 17-18.
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 43.
28AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 3, 17-18
10

finance by corporations) or create unadministrable legal
distinctions (such as that between debt and equity) . Integration
would reduce or eliminate these undesirable effects." 29 While
the ALI Reporter's Study has shown that the classical system is
malfunctioning, that does not mean it is worth fixing, a fact to
which any owner of high-tech gadgetry can attest. 30
IV. An Ideal Corporate Tax Structure?
Implicit in the integrationists' argument for integration is
the idea that the classical system departs from some ideal
corporate tax structure. Put another way, if we had the luxury
of constructing a tax system freed of the baggage of operating
under the classical system for eighty years, what choices would
we make? If we can agree on what such an ideal corporate tax
structure would look like, then we can evaluate particular
integration proposals to see how close they come to the ideal.
The objectives of integration would then be keyed to eliminating
distortions that move us away from the ideal. 31
There is general agreement that the end to be achieved by
any system of integration is to interrelate investor and
29ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 3. For a more detailed
overview of defects of classical system, see McLure, Once is Enough: The
Taxation of Corporate Equity Income (1977), at 3-14 [hereinafter McLure, Once
is Enough]; McLure, supra note 21, at 535-549.
30See Getting Things Fixed — Option: Don't Fix It, Consumer Reports, Jan.
1994, at 34-36.
31See generally Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the




corporate taxes so that all corporate income is taxed once and
only once. 32 The meaning of a "single level of tax" is less
clear. Like many issues of tax policy, decisions made with
respect to this foundational definition have broad implications
for choice of an integration system and its structural
characteristics. In the words of Professor Ginsburg, "where you
start is everything." 33
The 1992 Treasury Report on Integration of the Individual
and Corporate Tax Systems [hereinafter Treasury Report] states
that a single level of tax is achieved when all corporate income
is taxed at the corporate level at a uniform rate. 34 This
accords with the Treasury Report's focus on the economic effects
of the classical system on business. Under this view, the fact
that shareholders may receive a diminished return on their
corporate investment as compared to a noncorporate investment is
less significant than the fact that the cost of capital to
corporations is increased. 35 For example, the Treasury Report's
authors are not disturbed by the fact that exacting the toll at
the corporate level means that tax-exempt entities are subject to
32Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 12-13; ALI Reporter's Study, supra
note 5, at 1; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 18.
33Ginsburg, Maintaining Subchapter S in an Integrated Tax World,
Colloquium on Corporate Tax Integration, 47 Tax L. Rev. 665, 677 (1992).
34Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 12-13.
35See, e.g., "Restructuring the U.S. Tax System for the 21st Century:
an Option for Fundamental Reform," with Attachment 2, released by the Treasury
Department Office of Tax Policy, December, 10, 1992, reprinted in BNA Daily
Tax Report (December 11, 1992).
12

a heavier tax burden than they would be had they instead invested
in noncorporate assets. 36 Indeed, the Treasury Report
specifically recommends that the tax burden on tax-exempt
entities with respect to corporate equity should not be reduced
because of integration. 37
The clear focus of the Treasury Report is to ensure that
every dollar of corporate income is subject to taxation at a
specified rate. For example, the Treasury Report does not
recommend extending the benefit of corporate level tax
preferences to shareholders as some corporate income would
thereby escape all taxation. 38 Thus, "taxing business income
once," the subtitle of the Treasury Report, means just that—all
corporate income is taxed once without regard to the nature of
the income or the tax classification of the recipient of
corporate distributions.
Corporations are proper subjects for taxation in their own
right under the Treasury approach. The problem is not taxing
corporate earnings twice. The Treasury's plan provides dividend
relief by allowing shareholders to exclude from gross income
distributions out of corporate taxable income. 39 The Treasury's
understanding of the meaning of "integration" is thus very
Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 15-16.
37Jd.
38Jd. at 15.
39Treasury Recommendation, supra note 8, at L-7; see also Yin, supra
note 31, at 434-35.
13

narrow—to prevent a second shareholder level tax on dividends
out of earnings that have already been taxed at the corporate
level. The goal of such "integration" is to reduce the cost
differential between debt and equity financing and to reduce the
incentive for earnings retention within the corporate sector.
While dividend relief "integration" would also incidentally
reduce the bias against corporate equity investment, the broader
issue of absolute equality between corporate and noncorporate
investment opportunities is not a primary goal.
The Treasury Department admitted that its understanding of
"integration" does not comport with the traditional formulation
of commentators. 40 For example, most integrationists, including
Professor Warren, reject the propriety of a corporate level tax
on distributed income since individuals who engage in consumption
ultimately bear the burden of all taxes. 41
Several writers have suggested that an ideal corporate tax
structure would be analogous to the existing partnership tax
structure and thus designed to produce a single level of tax at
the investor level. 42 The partnership (or flow-through) method
replaces the corporate level income tax and instead allocates
items of corporate income, loss, deduction and credit
40Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 12-13.
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 45.
See, e.g., McLure, supra note 21, at 549-50; Schler, Taxing Corporate
Income Once (or Hopefully Not at All): A Practitioner's Comparison of the
Treasury and ALI Integration Models, Colloquium on Corporate Integration, 47
Tax. L. Rev. 509, 521 (1992); Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 678; AICPA Report,
supra note 6, at 19; Yin, supra note 31, at 433-34.
14

proportionately among its shareholders. 43 Commentators have
described the flow-through method as administratively unworkable
for corporate tax purposes but still a "conceptually pure"
yardstick in that it assumes pass-through of all tax attributes
to shareholders in proportion to their stock holdings. 44 Thus,
"integration" under the partnership approach has a very broad
objective: to ensure that the corporate source income of all
shareholders — high-bracket or low-bracket, taxable or tax-
exempt, foreign or domestic — is taxed in exactly the same
fashion as their noncorporate source income.
The partnership method is thought to be conceptually pure in
that it:
• furthers the goal of horizontal equity since
corporate source income, whether retained or distributed, is
taxed at the same rate as all other income of the shareholder.
• furthers the goal of vertical equity since corporate
source income is taxed at the particular shareholder's marginal
rate.
• would be neutral with respect to corporate financial
decision-making since effective tax rates would not turn on
whether the corporation distributed or retained its earnings.
• generally would not favor debt financing over equity
financing since corporate payments would be subject to the same
single tax at the shareholder level.
43AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 43.
44McLure, supra note 21, at 549-50.
15

• would eliminate the bias against corporate
investment since corporate source income would be taxed like any
other capital income. 45
The tide of opinion rejects the shareholder allocation or
partnership method as administratively unworkable for several
reasons:
• Corporations would have to keep records of which
shareholders held its stock on any given date of the taxable year
and would have to maintain complicated records to allocate




• Shareholders would have to make adjustments to their
stock basis in a manner akin to current partnership tax rules. 47
• Layered corporations would pose problems since no
corporation could properly allocate items to its shareholders
until it had first received notice of its allocation of
particular tax items from corporations in which it owns stock. 48
• The increased use of stock options, stock warrants,
preferred stock, and other queer capital interests has made the
McLure, supra note 21, at 549-50; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 43-
50; see Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 29.
46McLure, supra note 21, at 562; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 44-45;
see also Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 32-35.
McLure, supra note 21, at 562; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 45-46.
McLure, supra note 21, at 562; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 46;
Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 35.
16

capital structure of corporations so complex that allocation of
tax items among different capital interests is bewildering. 49
• Shareholders might not have cash on hand to pay tax
on their distributive share of retained corporate earnings. 50
I agree with the commentators that the flow-through or
partnership method is administratively infeasible. Still, for
purposes of this critique, I accept the partnership method as a
useful analytic tool.
V. Which System of Integration Is Best?
If the distortions of the classical system are undesirable,
what is the best way to lessen those distortions? The
integration literature contains many methods that could
effectively reduce some or all of the distortions of the
classical system. Whether one method is to be preferred largely
depends upon the goals of "integration."
As discussed supra in Section IV. , the precise scope of
"integration" is disputed. In its broadest formulation,
integration is designed to ensure absolute parity of tax
treatment for corporate versus noncorporate source income. In
its narrow formulation, the goal of integration is to ensure that
49McLure, supra note 21, at 562; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 48;
Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 32-33.
McLure, supra note 21, at 562; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 48; see
also Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 27-29 (Treasury's shareholder
allocation prototype retains current corporate income tax as a withholding
mechanism for payment of the shareholder level tax, as a measure to ensure




corporate earnings that are taxed at the corporate level are not
again taxed when distributed as dividends to shareholders. Which
of these formulations (or a middle ground) is reflected in the
ALI Reporter's Study?
While the ALI Reporter's Study adopts the broad
formulation's prescription of a single shareholder level tax, it
is philosophically closer to the narrow "integration"
formulation. For example, in many respects, the ALI Reporter's
Study is consistent with the Treasury Report's fixation on
ensuring that no corporate income fall through the cracks. For
example, the ALI Reporter's Study does not recommend that the
benefit of corporate preferences be extended to shareholders nor
that the tax burden on corporate source income of tax-exempt
entities be reduced although the horizontal equity concept
mandates those actions. 51 Thus, while a "single level of tax"
could be interpreted to mean taxing all corporate income once at
whatever rate applies to the particular distributee (zero percent
for a tax-exempt shareholder) , that is not the approach taken in
the ALI Reporter's Study. 52
The ALI Reporter's Study states that the "basic rationale"
for integration is to eliminate the distortions of the classical
system. 53 This reflects adoption of the narrow integration
approach. While the ALI shareholder credit prototype does
51Jd. at 98, 163-64; see Yin, supra note 31, at 442.
52See Yin, supra note 31, at 442.
53ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 44.
18

contain certain structural features that more properly comport
with a broad understanding of "integration", these digressions
generally represent necessary departures to ensure the overall
integrity of the integration model.
The ALI Reporter's Study does not explicitly list
foundational precepts for design of its narrow integration
system. However, we can distill and discern the key bedrock
features of an integration system that Professor Warren would
find acceptable:
1. The system must be administratively feasible. 54
2. The system must be comport with the realization
requirement of current law. 55
3. The system must further the goal of vertical equity by
exacting the ultimate single tax at the shareholder level. 56
4. The system must tax corporate earnings, whether retained
or distributed, once and only once. 57
In the introduction to Part 2 of the ALI Reporter's Study,
six methods for mitigating the distortions of the classical
system are briefly reviewed. All are summarily rejected except
54See ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 48-49 (rejecting
partnership method because of complexity) .
See Id. at 49-50 (rejecting integration system that taxes shareholders
on annual change in stock value)
.
See ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 49 (rejecting dividend
exclusion method because it applies the single, integrated tax on corporate
earnings at the corporate level and not at the shareholder level).
57See Id. at 49 (rejecting a corporate level cash flow tax since it





distribution related integration. 58 The Study fails to address
perhaps the most obvious method for decreasing the tax burden on
corporate source income: reduction or elimination of the
corporate level tax. 59 Under Professor Warren's foundational
precepts, it is clear he would find this method unacceptable
since all shareholders would benefit equally from a tax cut and
retained corporate earnings would escape current taxation.
Given the ALI Reporter's Study's adoption of the narrow
integration formulation and its unstated foundational precepts,
its recommendation of a distribution-related integration system
comes as no surprise. What is unclear is why Professor Warren
prefers the shareholder credit integration (or imputation) method
over the dividend deduction method. After explaining the
mechanics of the two methods and going to great lengths to prove
that the tax results under the two methods is essentially
equivalent, he then immediately turns his attention toward the
structural aspects of an imputation system without an explanation
for his preference. 60
A. Shareholder Credit Integration
Under shareholder credit integration or imputation, the
shareholder includes a grossed up amount in gross income equal to
the amount of the dividend payment plus the associated corporate
58Jd. at 47-49.
59Feldstein and Frisch, Corporate Tax Integration: A Quantitative
Comparison of Alternatives at 7 (1977).
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 50-58.
20

level tax withheld with respect to the dividend payment. The
shareholder computes his federal income tax liability in the
normal manner and is allowed a tax credit equal to the amount of
the associated corporate level tax withheld with respect to the
dividend payment. If the amount of the credit is greater than
the tax liability of the particular shareholder, vertical equity
would be adversely affected unless the shareholder is permitted
to use the credit against his or her tax liability arising from
other income or, if the shareholder has no other tax liability,
the credit is refundable. The effect of the imputation method is
that the corporate tax becomes simply a withholding tax on
corporate source income distributed to individuals. Such
distributed earnings are thus subject to a single tax at the
shareholder's marginal bracket rate. 61
While designing an integration system would be a simple
exercise if every shareholder was an individual U.S. citizen,
designing a system that ensures a single level of tax on
corporate source income paid to tax-exempt, corporate, and
foreign shareholders results in complexity. A key structural
advantage of the imputation method is that the credit mechanism
can be used to deny the benefits of integration to "all those
troublesome folk." 62
The advantages of shareholder credit integration include:
61Id. at 50-52; see AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 54-59.
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 52. The troublesome folk
appellation is from Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 677.
21

• It eliminates the double taxation problem with respect to
dividend distributions so that from the shareholder's perspective
the bias against corporate investment is reduced. 63
• It furthers the goal of vertical equity by taxing
distributed corporate earnings at the shareholder's marginal
bracket. 64
• In modified form, it can extend the benefits of
integration to earnings retained by the corporation. 65
• It reduces the tax incentive for retention of corporate
earnings within the corporation. 66
• It can flexibly address the issue of whether the benefit
of corporate tax preferences is passed to shareholders. 67
• It is easy to administer if a fixed-rate credit is
used. 68
• The credit mechanism allows discrimination against




Cheney, supra note 17, at 1822; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 55, 59.
Cheney, supra note 17, at 1822; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 55, 59.
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 15, 126-27; AICPA Report, supra
note 6, at 57.
Cheney, supra note 17, at 1822; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 55, 59
Cheney, supra note 17, at 1822; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 57.
Cheney, supra note 17, at 1822; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 55, 59
Cheney, supra note 17, at 1822; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 56-57.
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• The credit mechanism ensures taxpayer compliance since
the corporation pre-pays the shareholder's tax; shareholders must
file returns to claim the benefit of the credit. 70
• Because imputation is the system adopted by most
countries that have integrated their corporate and individual tax
levies, the U.S. can benefit from international experience. 71
• The prevalence of imputation among industrialized nations
simplifies negotiation of tax treaties. 72
The disadvantages of shareholder credit integration include:
• As a distribution-related integration method, basic
imputation only provides relief as to dividend distributions.
This represents a departure from the partnership ideal since
retained earnings are not currently taxed at the shareholder's
tax rate. Under imputation, retained earnings are currently
taxed at a specified corporate rate with ultimate correct
taxation deferred until the shareholder receives a distribution
of the earnings.
• If the shareholder realizes a capital gain on the sale of
stock, a portion of the capital gain will likely be attributable
to the retention of after-tax earnings by the corporation.
Nevertheless, no credit is available to prevent the double
70Cheney, supra note 17, at 1822; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 58-59;
Sheppard, supra note 22, at 646.
7,AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 56, 59.
Id.; Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 93.
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taxation of those earnings. 73 As discussed infra at Section
VI. C, a constructive dividend and reinvestment option can
mitigate but not completely correct this problem.
• It does not pass losses through to shareholders and thus
departs from an ideal corporate tax structure (the partnership
method)
.
• Despite the global eguivalence of eguity and debt
financing, corporate managers may still prefer debt since they
can perceive the immediate relief of a tax deduction. 74
• Because the full benefits of integration under an
imputation system are generally not extended to foreign
shareholders or foreign income of U.S. corporations, imputation
may encourage Balkanization of the international economy since
residents are encouraged to invest in domestic corporations
earning domestic income (i.e., corporations that can pass credits
to their shareholders) . 75
B. The Dividend Deduction Method
Under the dividend deduction method, the corporation gets a
deduction equal to amounts paid as dividends. The immediate
effect of the deduction is to equalize the tax treatment of
73Schler, supra note 42, at 520.
74McLure, supra note 21, at 556; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 55.
7 Tillinghast, Corporate-Shareholder Integration as an Obstacle to the
International Flow of Eguity Capital: A Proposal, 56 Tax Notes 1215 (August
31, 1992); Wrappe, The Protectionist Potential of the Imputation Form of
Corporate Integration, 49 Tax Notes 727 (1990); see also AICPA Report, supra
note 6, at 10, 13.
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dividend and interest payments. Thus, the burden of the
corporate income tax will fall only on retained earnings. 76
The immediate result of this method is more cash in hands of
the corporation allowing corporate managers to increase dividend
amounts paid to shareholders should they so desire. 77 As the
corporation has increased cash flow, some integrationists prefer
the dividend deduction method since it provides additional
opportunities for corporate capital accumulation. On the
downside, this approach automatically extends the benefits of
integration to tax-exempt and foreign shareholders. 78
The dividend deduction method is theoretically simpler than
imputation from the shareholder's perspective since integration
is achieved through adjustments made at the corporate level. 79
This simplicity is illusory, however, because tax policy decision
makers are unlikely to enact any integration system that applies
the single, immutable tax at the shareholder level without some
guarantee of taxpayer compliance. Accordingly, any likely
1(\
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 52-53; McLure, supra note 21,
at 554-55; Smith, Tax Treatment of Dividends, House Committee on Ways and
Means, 3 Tax Revision Compendium 1543, 1544 (1959), excerpted in Sander and
Westfall, Readings in Federal Taxation (1970); Bittker and Eustice, Federal
Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders (5th Ed.), 1993 Cum. Supp. at
HI. 08.
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 52-53; Sheppard, supra note 22,
at 644; USA: Corporate Finance - Would Cutting the Dividend Tax Really Help?,
Institutional Investor (U.S. Edition) at 73 (August 30, 1990) (not clear that
eliminating the double taxation of dividends would lead to increased payout
levels as corporate managers might simply plow money back into the business).
78ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 52-53; Treasury Report, supra
note 6, at 107.




dividend deduction schematic would require the corporation to pay
over to the fisc some portion of dividends paid to each
shareholder as a withholding mechanism.
The advantages of the dividend deduction method include:
• It is easy to administer. 80
• It furthers the goal of vertical equity by taxing
distributed corporate earnings at the shareholder's marginal
bracket. 81
• Because a corporation receives a deduction for dividends
paid, this method eliminates corporate bias toward debt
financing. 82
• As discussed above, it increases corporate after-tax cash
flow and so corporate managers would be more likely to support




The disadvantages of the dividend deduction method include:
• As a distribution-related integration method, it only
provides relief as to dividend distributions. Retained earnings
remain subject to the corporate tax. If the shareholder realizes
a capital gain on the sale of stock, a portion of the capital
gain will likely be attributable to the retention of after-tax
80AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 51, 54; McLure, supra note 21, at 564.
81Cheney, supra note 17, at 1821-22; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 50,
54.
82Smith, supra note 76 at 1544; McLure, supra note 21, at 554-55;
Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 107.
83Sheppard, supra note 22, at 647.
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earnings by the corporation and so double taxation is not
completely eliminated. 84
• It falls short of partnership-like integration in that
losses of the corporation are not passed through to shareholders.
• It may result in a misallocation of resources by
discriminating against corporations that cannot distribute their
earnings for business reasons. 85
• It extends the full benefits of integration to all
shareholders including tax-exempt entities and foreigners. While
the U.S. could ensure that distributions made to foreign
shareholders are taxed fully by increasing withholding rates on
dividends, such action would require the renegotiation of many
existing treaties. 86
• It is less flexible than the imputation system in passing
through corporate tax preferences to shareholders. 87
• Because it differs from the imputation systems used by
most countries, it complicates negotiation of tax treaties. 88
84AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 52, 54.
85Smith, supra note 76, at 1545 ("If dividends are deductible, the
corporate tax becomes a tax on retained earnings, and retained earnings are by
far the most importance source of equity capital for industry in this country.
What is intended as relief for dividends paid becomes a penalty on earnings
retained. For those companies which have to retain all or virtually all of
their earnings ... a corporate tax solely on retained earnings would surely be
regarded as a penalty on growth.").
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 53; AICPA Report, supra note 6,
at 51-52, 54; Sheppard, supra note 22, at 645.
87AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 52, 54.




• It lacks a structural compliance feature so that an
auxiliary withholding mechanism would be required.
C. Warren's Preference for Shareholder Credit Integration
Is Unexplained But Justified
While Professor Warren inadequately explains his preference
for shareholder credit integration over the dividend deduction
method, I believe his choice is sound. My examination of the
pros and cons convinces me that on balance the imputation method
is better able to address the toughest issues encountered in
designing an integration system. In particular, the imputation
method's flexibility in handling tax-preferred income, tax-exempt
shareholders and foreign investors coupled with its compatibility
with foreign integration systems makes it the best system. 89
VI. The ALI Reporter's Study Integration Proposals
The ALI Reporter's Study contains twelve concrete proposals
that would convert the corporate income tax into a withholding
mechanism for an ultimate tax on corporate source income at the
shareholder level. 90 Professor Warren's imputation model is
technically first rate and clearly explained in a three step
process. First, he explains the particular structural challenge,
89See, AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 67 (recommending shareholder
credit integration); McLure, supra note 21, at 581-82 (preferring shareholder
credit integration over dividend deduction method). But see Treasury Report,
supra note 6, at 15 (favoring dividend exclusion system over imputation).
90ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 13-20. To aid the reader and




methods of addressing the issue, and advantages and disadvantages
of each method. Second, he makes a specific proposal. Finally,
he provides detailed comments explaining his reasons for and the
operation of his proposal.
Proposals 1-4 establish the basic structure for the
recommended imputation model. Proposal 5 provides a mechanism
for extending integration benefits to earnings retained by
corporations. Proposals 6 and 7 provide rules to ensure that
corporate source income does not escape the single, integrated
tax by sale, death, redemption or liquidation. Proposals 8-10
provide recommendations for special shareholders: corporate,
tax-exempt, and foreign. Proposal 11 provides a rule by which a
U.S. corporation may avoid further taxation of foreign source
income that another nation has already taxed. Proposal 12
provides rules to phase in integration over an unspecified period
by adjusting various corporate financial accounts.
In the following sections, I point out noteworthy aspects of
many but not all of the 12 proposals. Because I have
intentionally limited this critique to the domestic aspects of
the ALI proposal, I do not address Proposals 10 or 11 at all.
A. Coverage of the ALI Imputation Model
While the structure and operation of the ALI imputation
model is generally clearly explained, the intended coverage of
the integrated tax system is unclear. Does the ALI Reporter's
Study envision that Subchapter S corporations will have continued
29

viability? 91 It does not say. If the sole function of the
corporate tax is to serve as a withholding mechanism for an
ultimate tax at the shareholder level, do we need a corporate
level alternative minimum tax? 92 The ALI Reporter's Study does
not take a position on the issue. 93
B. Basic Structure of the ALI Imputation Model
Proposals 1 and 2 provide a correlative system by which a
corporation will in effect prepay the income tax liability of its
shareholders with respect to all dividend distributions. 94 For
this purpose, whether the corporation has accumulated or current
earnings and profits is irrelevant and, indeed, this is one area
where the ALI imputation model would simplify tax administration
by eliminating the earnings and profits concept. 95 Under
Proposal 1, the cumulative amount of U.S. corporate income taxes
paid by a corporation is tracked in a Taxes Paid Account (TPA)
.
All dividends paid by the corporation will carry out an
associated shareholder credit computed at the highest individual
marginal tax bracket in the year of distribution and will reduce
91See Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 665; McNulty, Colloquium on Corporate
Tax Integration, Commentary: Preserving the Virtues of Subchapter S in an
Integrated World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 681 (1992); Schenk, Colloquium on Corporate
Tax Integration, Commentary: Complete Integration in a Partial Integration
World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 681 (1992).
^See Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 101-02 (concluding that the AMT
has a role to play in an imputation system to ensure that corporations that
retain large amounts of preference income pay a minimum amount of tax on
retained income).
93ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 101-02.




the TPA by the amount of the shareholder credit. If the TPA is
insufficient to fund the shareholder credit, the corporation must
pay an advance corporate tax sufficient to fund the shareholder
credit. Advance tax paid by a corporation may be carried forward
to offset future corporate tax liability.
The ALI Reporter's Study properly advocates full
refundability of the shareholder credit in Proposal 2. a. Failure
to allow refundability with respect to low-income individuals
would adversely impact on the goal of horizontal equity since the
corporate source income of low-income individuals would be
subject to a heavier tax burden than other income. It also would
decrease vertical equity since high bracket taxpayers could make
full use of imputation credits while some low bracket taxpayers
could not. 96 Thus, corporate source income distributed to a zero
bracket individual taxpayer would escape tax altogether. While
such a result may comport with our vertical equity goal, such a
result may be objectionable if the zero bracket taxpayer is a
tax-exempt entity. Under current law, corporate earnings
distributed to tax-exempt entities as dividends are subject to a
single corporate-level levy. Thus, allowing credit refundability
to tax-exempt entities under imputation would represent a tax
Id. at 103; McLure, supra note 21, at 553-54; see also McLure, Once
is Enough, supra note 29 at 15-17 (refundability of credit under Carter
Commission integration proposal). Cf . Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 103
(permitting low-bracket taxpayers to use excess imputation credits to offset




decrease from current law. For these reasons, some imputation
proposals deny refundability to tax-exempt entities. 97
The ALI model permits full credit refundability to tax-
exempt entities under Proposal 2 but this tax reduction would be
neutralized by creating a new explicit tax on the corporate
source income of tax-exempt entities under Proposal 9. 98 While
the idea that the tax burden on tax-exempt entities "should be
uniform and explicitly determined as a matter of tax policy" 99
has clear appeal, its pursuit in the context of an integration
proposal is unwise. Tax-exempt entities would vigorously oppose
any explicit tax on their corporate source income as the
existence of such a tax structure would make them pawns in the
annual deficit-cutting games. 100 Their opposition could sound
the death knell for integration. 101
The ALI Reporter's Study notes that the explicit tax under
Proposal 9 could be extended to the noncorporate income of tax-
exempt entities but it does not make a specific recommendation.
The advantage of broader coverage would be to eliminate the
incentive for tax-exempt entities to employ individual taxpayers
See Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 103-04.
98ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 163-65.
"id. at 164.
100See Break and Pechman, supra note 13, at 99-100.
See Coven, Corporate Tax Policy for the Twenty-First Century:
Integration and Redeeming Social Value, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 495 at n. 42
(1993) (suggesting the Treasury Report prefers the dividends received
exclusion approach because it places the exempt organizations in the weakest
possible position to sustain their tax-preferred status).
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as conduits to avoid the explicit tax. 102 Given the extensive
stockholdings of tax-exempt entities 103 , a decision to tax
corporate but not noncorporate income would encourage tax-exempt
entities to redirect their investment toward the noncorporate
sector and thus would directly undercut integration's goal of
reducing the bias against corporate equity investment. 104 As
Professor Warren was willing to endorse an explicit tax on tax-
exempt entities, it is hard to understand his reluctance to
follow through with a specific recommendation to tax both
corporate and noncorporate income.
Under the basic imputation crediting structure with a
uniform gross up percentage, all dividends of equal amount carry
out the same shareholder credit, whether made out of taxable
income or preference income of the corporation or both. When
corporate preference income is distributed, a shareholder
receives a credit larger than the taxes paid by the corporation
with respect to the preference income. This phenomenon is called
"superintegration. " 105
There are two logical ways to prevent superintegration.
First, the shareholder credit could be harmonized with the amount
of corporate taxes actually paid with respect to each
1 ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 167.
103Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 67-68 (pension funds and charities
own about 37% of U.S. corporate equity).
104ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 167; Halperin, supra note 18,
at 646.
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 61-63.
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distribution. Alternatively, the corporate taxes paid with
respect to each distribution could be harmonized to the amount of
a fixed, uniform shareholder credit. 106 The ALI Reporter's Study
opts for a uniform shareholder credit because it is much simpler
than a system that requires corporations to keep track of the
extent to which particular distributions have been made out of
preference income. 107 To the extent DWT is levied on
distributions out of preference income, the ALI model would
result in a heavier tax burden than under the partnership ideal
as it would not pass through the benefit of the preferences to
shareholders and so taxpayers wanting flow-through treatment in
connection with preferred activities would choose a noncorporate
form of organization. 108 As compared to current law, the ALI
uniform credit approach increases the relative tax burden of tax-
exempt shareholders on distributions made out of preference
income. 109 Still, the ALI choice is reasonable since the ability
to pass preference income to tax-exempt shareholders is not worth
inflicting significant complexity on all shareholders. 110
106Jd. at 67-90.
107Jd. at 88; Cheney, supra note 17, at 1822; AICPA Report, supra note 6,
at 55-56, 59.
108See Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 63.
109ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 87; AICPA Report, supra note 6,
at 57.
n0Compare Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 15, 95-101 (choosing a
variable credit in structuring its imputation model and then rejecting the
model as too complex).
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Proposal 3 allows Congress to make an intelligent decision
whether to extend the benefit of particular corporate tax
preferences to shareholders. 111 Considering the decision to use
a fixed credit in the interest of simplicity, Proposal 3 may be
viewed as a partial relief measure. The corporation would
separately account for those selected items thought to be
appropriate for pass-through treatment in an Exempt Income
Account (EIA) . Distributions would first come out of taxable
income until the TPA was exhausted and then out of the EIA. 112
While Proposal 3 permits a flexible response to the issue of
preferred income, artful taxpayers will doubtless attempt to
stream EIA distributions to higher bracket taxpayers. The ALI
Reporter's Study acknowledges this fact and concedes that
Proposal 3 "might" require anti-abuse provisions. 113 While the
Internal Revenue Service could arguably address tax-motivated
allocations to particular shareholders under authority of IRC
§§446 (b) and 482, tax policy legislators would be dissatisfied
with such post hoc corrections and would likely enact a complex
battery of anti-streaming provisions. Ironically, the added
complexity of anti-streaming provisions may rob the fixed rate
credit scheme of much of the simplicity that made it so
attractive in the first place. Even so, the uniform credit
method is preferable since a variable credit method would require





different but equivalent anti-streaming provisions to prevent
allocations of unfranked (without an attached credit) dividends
to tax-exempt entities. 114
As discussed supra, a disadvantage of shareholder credit
integration is that it does not eliminate the corporate bias for
debt financing. Proposal 4 is intended to reduce the corporate
preference for debt financing by establishing a counterpart
Interest Withholding Tax (IWT) to the Dividend Withholding Tax
under Proposal I. 115 Bondholders who receive corporate interest
payments would receive a refundable credit that could be used
against the bondholder's income tax liability in the same manner
as the shareholder credit. While interest would continue to be
deductible to the corporation, the corporation's payment of IWT,
unlike payment of DWT, would not be creditable against corporate-
level income taxes. 116 The ALI Reporter's Study concedes that
Proposal 4 is an incomplete solution since tax-exempt entities
could use individual taxpayers as financial intermediaries to
avoid the IWT bite. 117 Thus, a complete solution to the debt-
equity conundrum would require taxing tax-exempt entities on both
corporate and noncorporate investment income. 118
114Jd. at 106; Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 103-04.




Schler, supra note 42, at 534.
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C. Extending Integration to Retained Earnings.
As a distribution-related integration system, basic
imputation does not directly to relieve the double taxation of
retained earnings of the corporation. However, if the corporate
tax rate exceeds applicable individual tax rates, imputation may
have the effect of reducing corporate retained earnings since
lower bracket shareholders can be expected to pressure corporate
management to distribute dividends. 119 Pechman notes that
encouraging larger dividend payouts by corporations would not be
applauded by everyone. Retained earnings of corporations make up
a large pool of savings in the United States the reduction of
which many would consider unwise. 120
Proposal 5 of the ALI Reporter's Study allows a corporation
with a positive TPA balance that wants to retain its earnings to
declare a constructive dividend to its shareholders. The
shareholder would receive the normal DWT credit funded by the TPA
but instead of receiving cash would increase his or her adjusted
basis in the stock. The corporation would keep track of amounts
constructively distributed in a separate financial account.
Subsequent dividend distributions would be a tax-free return of
119ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 115-116.
120Pechman, Federal Tax Policy, 187 (5th ed. 1987); see also Sheppard,
Good Times, Bad Times: Business Tax Developments In the Last 20 Years, 57 Tax




capital to the extent made out of this account with shareholders
making appropriate basis reductions. 121
The constructive dividend and reinvestment option would
preserve retained earnings as a valuable capital pool while
extending the benefits of integration to the constructively
reinvested proceeds since the basis increase prevents capital
gain taxation of the reinvested proceeds on a subseguent
disposition of the stock. 122 The constructive dividend option is
not a complete remedy to the retained earnings problem because of
two complications. First, the corporate tax rate on non-
preference income must be generally conform to the highest
individual income tax rate. If the individual rate is higher
than the corporate rate, the corporate level taxes paid (i.e.,
the TPA addition) with respect to a particular constructive
dividend would not fully fund the associated DWT credit. Thus,
the constructive dividend option depends on a positive TPA
balance. Second, even if the corporate and individual rates are
equalized, to the extent that a corporation has retained
preference income and a zero TPA balance, declaring a
constructive dividend would require payment of an advance
corporate tax to fund the associated DWT. 123 In effect,
corporate managers would be accelerating taxation of the
121Jd. at 127-28.
122ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 125-127; Treasury Report, supra
note 6, at 87-88.
123See supra text accompanying notes 95-96, 105-108.
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distributed corporate preference income and gaining no benefit
except a shareholder basis increase.
In addition to its earnings retention function, the
constructive dividend option has one other advantage not
mentioned by the ALI Reporter's Study. Because a large TPA
balance, like net operating losses, could make a corporation an
attractive takeover candidate 124 , declaration of a constructive
dividend allows a corporation with a large TPA balance to fend
off a hostile suitor by distributing the TPA to shareholders as
DWT.
Under Proposal 5, the corporation decides the amount to be
constructively distributed to each class of stock in the same
manner that it currently sets dividend policy. The ALI
Reporter's Study recognizes that anti-abuse provisions might have
to be enacted to prevent tax-motivated streaming of constructive
dividends to particular shareholders but makes no specific
recommendations. 125 Presumably such anti-abuse provisions would
require allocation of the constructive distribution among the
capital interests of the corporation in a manner akin to the
substantial economic effect rules of partnership tax. 126
However, the allocation quagmire in this context involves the
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 13, 92-93 (suggesting §382-like
limits on the amount of DWT carry forward that would be creditable against
future corporate tax liability); Schler, supra note 42, at 561-62.
125ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 128-29; see also Treasury
Report, supra note 6, at 87.
126IRC §704 (b) .
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same allocation issues that render the partnership method
administratively unworkable. 127
D. Guaranteeing the Shareholder Level Tax:
The ALI Model's Achilles Heel?
The primary tax liability in any shareholder credit
integration model is at the shareholder level. In the ALI model,
a single level of tax is achieved by effectively exempting the
corporation from taxation except as a withholding mechanism with
respect to the shareholder level tax. 128 Thus, the security of
the tax base will be subverted if the shareholder can cash out
his investment in other than a dividend distribution.
Under the ALI imputation model, corporate income is taxable
as ordinary income when finally distributed (actually or
constructively) to shareholders. However, if the shareholder
sells his stock before the earnings are distributed or receives a
liquidating distribution, the shareholder will have converted
ordinary income into a capital gain. 129 To illustrate, suppose
an individual in the highest tax bracket incorporates a business
with nominal capital that then earns $100 and pays a tax of $35.
If the corporation immediately declares a dividend of the
remaining $65, the shareholder has gross income of $100 (i.e.,
127See supra at text accompanying note 49. Compare Treasury Report,
supra note 6, at 88 (limiting constructive dividends to holders of common and
participating preferred stock)
.
128Schler, supra note 42, at 519.
129ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 130; Schler, supra note 42, at
526-27; Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 669.
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the $65 grossed up by the DWT of $35) and will pay a tax of
$39.60.
Now, instead assume, that the individual liquidates the
corporation. The shareholder would have an amount realized of
$100 (the $65 cash and the refundable TPA of $35) and a capital
gain of $100. The shareholder will pay the maximum capital gains
tax of $28 and realize a tax savings of $11.90, or over 29%. 130
Thus, under the ALI model, shareholder capital gains must be
taxed at ordinary income rates to ensure the security of the
single, immutable shareholder level tax on corporate income. 131
While extensive use of the constructive dividend and
reinvestment option would diminish the threat to the treasury,
the efficacy of the constructive dividend option is limited, as
explained above. 132 Accordingly, Proposal 6 to the ALI
Reporter's Study states that gains on the sale of corporate stock
will be taxed at the same rate as that applicable to dividends
received by the seller. 133 This requirement does not mean that
all shareholders must be taxed in exactly the same fashion. It
simply means that the dividend rate and the capital gains rate
applicable to a particular shareholder (e.g., tax-exempt entity)
130This example is based on Schler, supra note 42, at 526-27. I have
modified the illustration for current tax rates.
131Yin, supra note 31, at 447, 449 (
"
[E]nactment of a secure single tax
on corporate-source income using the approach of the ALI Reporter's Study
would be contingent on passage of a series of controversial proposals.
Failure to adopt any one of them could cause much of the system to unravel.")
132See infra text accompanying notes 122-123.
133ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 129-30.
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must be the same to guarantee that all corporate income is taxed
once at the desired uniform rate. 134 Similarly, Proposal 7
attempts to ensure that the promised shareholder level tax is not
avoided by use of a redemption or liquidation. 135
E. ALI Imputation Model Results
By eliminating the double taxation of distributed corporate
earnings, the ALI imputation model effectively mitigates three of
the four major distortions noted supra at Section III. First,
the elimination of a corporate level tax on distributed income
reduces the incentive for individuals to invest in noncorporate
assets. Second, the removal of the double tax penalty reduces
the incentive for corporations to retain rather than distribute
earnings. Finally, corporations do not have to engage in
financial legerdemain to achieve a single level of tax; a simple
dividend payment does the trick under the ALI imputation model.
The ALI model is an incomplete response at best to the fourth
major distortion: the debt-equity quagmire. As discussed supra,
from the shareholder's perspective, reduction of the double tax
burden on corporate equity decreases the incentive to invest in
debt instruments. However, the corporation will continue to
prefer debt financing under the ALI model since corporate
managers can experience the immediate thrill of a tax deduction.
While the ALI model reduces most of the major distortions of
the classical system, it does not track with the partnership
134Schler, supra note 42, at 527.
1JJALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 143-44.
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ideal since retained corporate earnings are not taxed at the
shareholder's marginal tax rate. Similarly, its failure to pass
through preferences (except as specifically enumerated) or losses
to shareholders is a significant departure from the ideal
partnership norm. In this respect, the ALI model does not make
significant changes to current law and thus subchapter S will
continue to have appeal for loss corporations. 136
VII. Is the Known Devil Is Better Than the Unknown Devil? 137
The title of the ALI report, "Integration of the Individual
and Corporate Income Taxes, Reporter's Study of Corporate Tax
Integration," promises the reader an unbiased, balanced
examination of integration. The unmistakable message of the 238-
page ALI Reporter's Study is that the distortions of the
classical system (described in 24 pages) are so unbearable that
the only logical action is immediate integration along the lines
outlined in its 12 proposals (176 pages) . Judging from the
treatment accorded them (2 pages) , one is left with the distinct
impression that the countervailing arguments against integration
are unworthy of consideration.
Reflecting in 1992 on first twenty years of Tax Notes
magazine, Mr. Thomas F. Field, editor and publisher, remarked
that for all the seeming frenzied reform activity, there had not
136McNulty, supra note 91, at 689.
137The phrase as applied to the integration debate is from Bittker and
Eustice, supra note 76, at 51.08.
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been any fundamental change in our tax system and noted:
"Corporate-personal tax integration remains an idea, not a
concrete legislative proposal, despite scholarly discussion,
Treasury studies, and a generation-long assault by business
groups on the double taxation of corporate income." 138 This
observation raises the obvious question: If integration is so
clearly a good idea, why are we still grousing about the
classical system? The answer, not surprisingly, is that not
everyone is convinced that integration is a good idea.
A. Quantifying the Benefits of Integration
Before turning to the objections to integration, it may be
helpful to attempt to quantify the benefits of integration. We
have seen that the classical system results in four major
distortions that are generally undesirable. What is the economic
cost of these distortions? While the consensus view of the
integration literature is that the classical system does result
in distortions, until the 1992 Treasury Report, there had been
little effort to quantify the economic cost of the classical
system. 139
The Treasury Report predicts first order gains of $2.5 to
$25 billion annually in U.S. economic welfare depending upon the
138Field, Taxes and Tax Notes, Then and Now: Two Decades in Review, 57
Tax Notes 829, 830 (November 12, 1992).
139Sunley, Colloquium on Corporate Integration, Corporate Integration:
An Economic Perspective, 47 Tax L. Rev. 621 (1992); Shuldiner, Colloquium on
Corporate Integration, Commentary, Corporate Integration: Do the
Uncertainties Outweigh the Benefits?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 653 (1992).
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chosen integration prototype. 140 While the Treasury Department
should be complimented for its effort to quantify the benefits of
integration, the economic models used are very rough and the
assumptions used to predict behavioral responses to integration
are unproven and possibly overstated. 141 Additionally, the
predicted gains are based upon full implementation of the chosen
integration system. The Treasury Report makes no estimates of
the transition costs associated with replacing the classical
system. 142 Nevertheless, most economists believe integration
will result in significant efficiency gains even if the gains may
fall short of those predicted by the Treasury models. 143
B. If The Classical System Is So Bad,,
Why Have We Endured It For So Long?
Accepting as true that integration will produce significant
efficiency gains, why has the U.S. not wholeheartedly embraced
abandonment of the classical system? One irony of the
integration debate is that the system that comes closest to our
ideal corporate tax structure may not be the best system or at
least may not be politically possible. In the following
140Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 111; cited favorably by ALI
Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 43.
Shuldiner, supra note 139 at 655; Cummings, 'Taxing Business Income
Once': Where's the Beef? A Review and Critique of the Treasury Study, 54 Tax
Notes 1391, 1393, 1394 (1992).
142Shuldiner, supra note 139 at 654.
mId. at 655. Contra Pechman, supra note 120, at 188 ("There is no
evidence . .
. that the corporation tax has impaired the growth of the corporate
sector or of the U.S. economy as a whole.")
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paragraphs, I list some reasons integration is still just an idea
and not a concrete legislative proposal. My intention in listing
the countervailing arguments is not to pass judgment on their
truth or substantiality, but simply to show that the case for
integration is not as clear cut as the ALI Reporter's Study would
lead one to believe.
1 . The Need for Integration
The corporate level tax may be viewed as a second-best
solution to the undertaxation of undistributed corporate
income. 144 Double taxation dates from Revenue Act of 193 6 but
for fifty years double taxation was effectively neutralized by
several structural features of the tax system: high individual
tax rates, lower corporate tax rates, and preferential treatment
of capital gains. While the classical system's double taxation
of distributed corporate earnings did impose a heavier burden on
corporate investment, to the extent that the taxpayer made long-
term investments in corporations that retained earnings, the
burden of double taxation was obviated. After the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, however, it became much more difficult for taxpayers to
neutralize the effects of double taxation. Congress increased
the relative tax burden on corporate source income to almost
twice the burden imposed on other income by (1) setting the
maximum corporate rate above maximum individual rate (so that
even low income taxpayers were hurt) ; (2) decreasing the benefit
144Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against Double Taxation of Corporate Income,
68 N. Carolina Law Review 613, 629-31 (1990).
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of deferral since corporations had to pay higher tax on retained
earnings; and (3) repealing the 50% capital gains deduction. 145
The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reform and Reconciliation Act reversed
the rate inversion that pertained from 1986 to 1993 by again
raising the highest individual rate to 39.6% as compared to a
maximum corporate rate of 3 5%. Thus, higher income taxpayers can
again find tax savings through corporate sector investment.
Some commentators have pointed out that the double tax
burden is not as burdensome as it might appear since there is a
great deal of integration under current law, some of it official
and some of it of the self-help variety. 146
2 . .Revenue Concerns
Integration would result in a significant loss of revenue.
For example, the Treasury Report estimates a revenue cost of
$14.6 billion for its shareholder credit prototype that lacked
credit refundability and denied the benefits of integration to
foreign and tax-exempt shareholders. The Treasury Report




145Jd. at 618-625 ("For the first time in history, therefore, the double
taxation of corporate income often causes such income to bear a tax burden





146 i_Johnson, Corporate Integration Discussed at American Law Institute
Conference, Tax Notes Today (January 9, 1992) (reporting remarks of Professor
James Eustice at Association of American Law Schools (AALS) meeting in San
Antonio, Texas); Bittker and Eustice, supra note 76, at 111.08(c).
147Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 152.
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Some commentators argue that the effects of raising other
taxes to replace the revenue lost because of integration may be
more objectionable than the effects of double taxation. 148
3. Vertical Equity
Because individual shareholders tend to be upper income
taxpayers, double taxation falls heavier on them and may increase
progressivity of the income tax in the aggregate. 149 While the
aggregate result of the incidence of the corporate tax may
further vertical equity, integrationists criticize it as an
exceptionally blunt instrument for achieving progressivity. 150
Other commentators believe that the full burden of the corporate
tax does not fall on shareholders but rather is shifted largely
to consumers. To the extent the burden is shifted forward to
consumers, the corporate tax is a crude sales tax that like all
general sales taxes is regressive in its effects. 151 Even if the
corporate tax is indirectly regressive, the public perception of
Kwall, supra note 144, at 616-17, 627 (higher individual rates needed
to maintain progressivity would increase pressure on Congress for additional
preferences and thus derail recent reform movement to a low rate, broad-based
income tax system); Johnson, supra note 146; Treasury Report, supra note 6, at
14 ("Replacement taxes may create distortions and alter the distribution of
tax burdens."); Cummings, supra note 141, at 1393-94 (1992).
Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-1985?, 80 (1985); Break and Pechman,
supra note 13, at 94; Kwall, supra note 144, at 616-17.
McLure, Once is Enough, supra note 29, at 3; McLure, supra note 21, at
535-36; Harriss, Taxation of Business: Fundamental Issues, Essays on Taxation
at 39, 44 (1974); AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 17; Feldstein and Frisch,
supra note 59, at 17.
1514 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Canada) (1966) at 3-9,
19-28, excerpted in Sander and Westfall, Readings in Federal Taxation, 449




the elimination of the corporate level tax is that it is a tax
break for corporations and the rich. 152
4 . Corpora te Opposi tion
While it might seem that corporations would be a natural
constituency for integration, not all corporations would be
benefitted by distribution-related integration as either a
dividend deduction or shareholder credit system would benefit
corporations that pay out large portions of their earnings. 153
Various tax preferences, many enacted as partial relief for the
double tax burden, benefit corporations in different degrees and
mean that effective rate of tax for corporations varies
widely. 154 If integration were financed by repeal of beneficial
tax preferences, businesses benefitting the most from preferences
would oppose integration as it would result in a major shift in
the relative tax burdens of dividend-paying corporations versus
growth corporations and noncorporate business entities. 155
Corporate managers also fear that shareholders will push for
dividends and the corporation will end up without funds for
152Sheppard, supra note 22, at 646.
153Cheney, supra note 17, at 1821; New York State Bar Association, The
Committee on Corporations of the Tax Section, Report on the Integration of
Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, 31 Tax Lawyer 37, 41, 63 (1977); AICPA
Report, supra note 6, at 8, 9.
154Break and Pechman, supra note 13, at 91.
New York State Bar Association, supra note 153 at 41, 63; McLure,
Where Tax Reform Went Astray, 31 Vill. L. Rev. 1619, 1657 (1986) (50% dividend
paid deduction proposal in Treasury I torpedoed by lukewarm support from




investment. 156 While some commentators are unsympathetic 157 ,
others fear that the already deplorable U.S. savings rate will be
further degraded. 158
Multinational corporations also may oppose integration since
it may upset the existing neutrality between foreign and domestic
investment. 159
5. State Tax Administrator Opposition
The Treasury Report has been criticized by New York State
Taxation and Finance Commissioner James Wetzler for not
addressing the effects of integration on state tax
administration. 160 Such criticism would be egually well directed
to the ALI Reporter's Study.
Besides issues of complexity for federal tax purposes,
integration raises many state tax administration issues
including:
• will the States conform their corporate and individual
income taxes to the federal model of integration?
156Cheney, supra note 17, at 1821; Johnson, supra note 146; AICPA Report,
supra note 6, at 8.
157Sheppard, supra note 12, at 841 (corporate managers oppose integration
because they like to "act as investment managers for the shareholders, and the
two-tier tax has always provided a convenient excuse").
I eg
Pechman, supra note 120, at 187.
159New York State Bar Association, supra note 153 at 63; Tillinghast,
supra note 75, at 1215; Wrappe, supra note 75 at 727.
160BNA Daily Tax Report, Surge in Limited Liability Company Laws Seen
Driving Move to Corporate Integration (May 26, 1993); Hubbard, New York Tax




• what effect will failure to conform have on success of
integration at the federal level?
• if states followed the federal lead in adopting
integration, what effect would this have on revenue distribution
(since corporations do not necessarily do business or pay state
income taxes in the same states where their shareholders
reside)? 161
6. Populism and Politics
Politicians fear backlash from voters' perception that
integration seems to give advantages to powerful corporations and
rich individuals. 162 If anything, Congress appears unmoved by
the pleas of integrationists and has frequently acted to bolster




New York State Bar Association, supra note 153, at 62-63 (net loser
States will be reluctant to follow the federal lead and "[a]ny material
departure from the federal system would result in undesirable complexity, and
might also counteract to some degree the anticipated effects of the federal
integration of shareholder and corporate income taxes"); see also Hubbard,
supra note 160, at 1143; AICPA Report, supra note 6, at 29-30.
ALI Reporter's Study, supra note 5, at 56; Cheney, supra note 17, at
1822; Hubbard, supra note 160, at 1143 (quoting James W. Wetzler, New York
Commissioner of Taxation and Finance); Kirchheimer, Nunn and Domenlcl Want To
Replace Tax System To Encourage Savings, 61 Tax Notes 143, 145 (October 11,
1993) (Danforth cautioned Nunn and Domenici that their consumption tax plan
with an integrated corporate tax would have to sold to taxpayers — "Please
don't underestimate the juice that distribution tables have. That's where the
debate is going to be."); Lee, The Corporate Income Tax - Who Really Pays,
Forbes, August 13, 1984 at 32(3). See also Epstein, Reagan's Offhand Tax
Remark Was Just That, Philadelphia Inquirer, Page A-l (January 28, 1983)
(President Reagan describing corporate tax as "hard to justify"; damage
control effort by Reagan aides denying abolition of corporate tax as a public
policy goal since it would reinforce perception that Reagan's policies were
unfair to the poor)
.
Sheppard, supra note 12, at 841 (citing repeal of General Utilities
doctrine and crackdown on publicly-traded partnerships); Use of Limited
Liability Companies Seen Not Jeopardizing Corporate Tax Base, Daily Tax Report
(BNA), March 30, 1993 (House Ways and Means Committee Hearings on limited
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The view that corporations are separate legal entities that
benefit from incorporation and therefore are suitable subjects
for taxation apart from individuals still has its adherents on
Capitol Hill. 164
Even if Congress is interested in integration, the tax
provisions will be multi-sectional, extremely complicated, and
involve almost every issue of corporate taxation. At least one
commentator doubts that Congress can produce coherent legislation
to implement integration. 165
If Congress were interested in integration, it seems
unlikely that the ALI imputation model would be the chosen
integration system. The ALI system imposes significant new tax
liability on shareholders (and on some debtholders) that are
currently tax-exempt. While imputation credits would mitigate
the effect of current dividend taxation, credits will not be
available to offset tax liability arising from sales of
appreciated stock, and so opposition to the repeal of
preferential capital gains treatment can be expected. As
explained above, failure to tax capital gains from stock
dispositions at the same rate as dividends would threaten the
security of the tax base and cause the fabric of the ALI
liability companies as self-help integration)
.
164Sheppard, Corporate Integration: Always Interesting and Often
Irrelevant, 58 Tax Notes 1415 (March 15, 1993) (reporting remarks of Peter
Cobb, business tax counsel of the Joint Committee on Taxation who guest ioned
the need for dividend relief since corporate tax is in effect a tax on access
to public securities markets).
Johnson, supra note 146.
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imputation model to unravel. 166 On the other hand, an
integration system based on a dividend paid deduction or dividend
received exclusion mechanism is politically more palatable since
they merely give taxpayers better dividend tax treatment and do
not impose any new taxes on anyone
.
167
C. The Classical System Is a Morass But It Is Our Morass
Most opponents of integration would doubtless agree with the
ALI Reporter's Study that the classical system is a hopelessly
complicated maze. However, unlike the ALI Study, the separatists
are not ready to junk the maze. They reason that even if we
cannot find our way out of the maze at least we know our way
around it. Yes, it is a morass but it is a morass we know. We
should be hesitant to replace it with a morass we do not know. 168
VIII. Conclusion
While the ALI Reporter's Study is a valuable addition to the
integration literature, its value lies in its detailed
examination of the mechanics of the shareholder credit
integration system. Unfortunately, the ALI Reporter's Study
makes no serious effort to prove that the distortions of the
classical system are so detrimental as to warrant "throwing chaos
See supra text accompanying notes 128-135.
1 fCISchler, supra note 42, at 520.
Cummings, supra note 141 at 1395; see also Yin, supra note 31, at 445







. . . to the winds." 169 There are enough uncertainties in the
integration debate to conclude that Professor Warren will find
the classical system wheezing and sputtering along should he
choose to return again to the fray in twelve years time. 170
Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 666 (quoting Justice Roger Traynor,
Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in Legal Institutions Today and Tomorrow at
56 (Monrad Paulsen ed., 1959)).
170See Sheppard, supra note 164, at 1415 (reporting remarks of Peter
Cobb, business tax counsel of the Joint Committee on Taxation to effect that
integration has no natural political constituency and is really only seriously




PROPOSALS OF THE ALI REPORTER'S STUDY
1. Dividend Withholding Tax. pp. 13, 92-93.
a. A dividend withholding tax (DWT) will be
imposed on distributing corporations with respect to qualified
dividends. The DWT rate will equal the highest individual tax
rate in the year of distribution [ , which will also be the
standard corporate rate]
.
b. Qualified dividends will be distributions of
money or property to shareholders as declared dividends or deemed
to be dividends by the Code, without regard to whether there are
current or accumulated corporate earnings and profits.
c. Each subchapter C corporation will maintain a
taxes paid account (TPA) with an initial balance of zero. The
balance in the TPA will be increased by the amount of U.S.
corporate income taxes, including minimum taxes, paid by the
corporation, and reduced by any corporate tax refunds received by
the corporation. Refunds in excess of a TPA balance will be
immediately due as DWT. Legislative adjustments to TPA balances
may be made in the case of major changes in tax rates.
d. The distributing corporation's liability for
DWT will be satisfied by any amount in the corporations' TPA.
Use of a TPA balance to satisfy DWT liability will result in a
corresponding reduction in the TPA. Amounts paid to the U.S.
Treasury as DWT will be creditable against future corporate tax
liability. This carryforward of DWT will be subject to
APPENDIX A

limitations similar to those in section 382 in the event of a
change in corporate ownership.
2. Shareholder Withholding Credit. pp. 13-14, 102.
a. On receipt of a qualified dividend, a
shareholder who is a noncorporate U. S. citizen or resident will
include the dividend (including the DWT) in gross income. The
associated DWT will be creditable against shareholder income tax
liability, with any excess refundable.
b. Pass-through entities, such as partnerships,
will pass through the dividend income and withholding credit in
accordance with the provisions applicable to such entities.
3. Certain Tax Preferences. pp. 14-15, p. 108.
a. Corporations will maintain an exempt income
account (EIA) to which will be added the qualified exempt income
received by the corporation, and from which will be subtracted
distributions of such income by the corporation to its
shareholders as qualified dividends.
b. Distributions of qualified dividends when
there is a zero balance in the TPA, but a positive balance in the
EIA, will give rise to neither DWT nor shareholder taxable
income. Instead, the dividend will be nontaxable to the
shareholders to the extent of the balance in the EIA.
Corporations will notify shareholders of the amounts to be
excluded from income a exempt dividends.

c. "Qualified exempt income" will be the
following specified categories of income received by
corporations: [interest excluded by section 103...]
d. Qualified tax credits will be treated as
corporate taxes paid for purposes of computing the balance in the
TPA. "Qualified tax credits" will be the following specified
categories of tax credits received by corporations: [••-]
e. The balance in the TPA will be reduced by the
product of the corporate tax rate and the following disallowed
deductions: [ . .
.
]
4. Interest Withholding Tax. pp. 15, 112.
An interest withholding tax (IWT) will be levied
on corporate payments of interest on other than trade credit at
the same rate as the DWT. The credit for taxes withheld will be
usable against U.S. tax liability and refundable to the same
extend as the shareholder withholding credit.
5. Constructive Dividends. pp. 15, 126-127.
a. In lieu of a qualified dividend of money or
property, a corporation may declare a constructive dividend to
its shareholders, followed by a constructive capital contribution
of the proceeds. Such a constructive dividend and reinvestment
will give rise to the same tax consequences as an actual
qualified dividend, followed by reinvestment of the after-tax
proceeds in stock of the distributing corporation. The
distributing corporation will notify its shareholders of the

amount to be included in income, the associated DWT, and the
resulting increase in basis.
b. Amounts constructively distributed and
reinvested will be recorded by the corporation in a previously
taxed dividends account. If the balance in the TPA is zero,
qualified dividends to shareholders will be considered as offsets
to shareholder basis to the extent of previously taxed dividends.
Qualified dividends in excess of such basis will be taxable
income to the shareholders.
6. Disposition of Stock. pp. 16, 129-130.
a. Gains on the sale of corporate stock will be
subject to taxation at the rates that are applicable to dividends
and other ordinary income received by the seller.
b. Losses on the sale of corporate stock will be
deductible to the extend of: (a) dividends and realized gains on
the sale of corporate stock, and (b) the excess of such losses
over net unrealized gains on shares of corporate stock.
Disallowed losses will be carried forward indefinitely.
c. An increase in share basis under section 1014
will be reduced by the allocable portion of the TPA balance
divided by the corporate tax rate.
7. Nondividend Distributions. pp. 16-17, 143-144.
a. In the case of a redemption of stock that is
subject to section 302(d), the distributing corporation and the
receiving shareholder will treat the amount paid for the shares
as a qualified dividend for purposes of computing the DWT and

shareholder withholding credit. In the case of a redemption
directly from a shareholder that is taxed as an exchange by the
shareholder under section 302(a), the corporation will reduce its
TPA by the product of the TPA balance and the ration of the fair
market value of shares redeemed to the fair market value of total
shares outstanding before redemption. Redeeming shareholders
will be notified of the per share reduction in TPA, which amount
will be included in the redeeming shareholders' amount realized
and creditable as DWT.
b. A corporation that purchases its own shares on
a stock market in a transaction to which (a) does not apply will
be entitled to a refund of the portion of its TPA balance
allocable to the repurchased shares.
c. If more than eighty percent of the stock of a
corporation is acquired from noncorporate shareholders by another
corporation in a taxable transaction, the acquired corporation
shall be entitled to a refund of its TPA balance allocable to the
purchased shares.
d. On complete liquidation of a corporation
subject to taxation under section 331, the remaining balance in
the TPA will be available pro rata as a shareholder withholding
tax credit for shareholders receiving liquidating payments. The
amount of this credit will be included in the amount realized by
the receiving shareholders. On complete liquidation of a
subsidiary subject to nonrecognition under section 3 32, the

receiving corporation will increase its TPA balance by its hare
of the liquidating corporation's TPA balance.
8. Corporate Investors. pp. 17-18, 154-155.
a. In the absence of an election, a shareholder
that is a U.S. corporation will include qualified dividends in
gross income, and credit the DWT against the resulting tax
liability, which, in turn, will increase its TPA.
b. In the case of a shareholder that is a U.S.
corporation and owns more than twenty percent of the stock of the
distributing corporation, the distributing corporation may elect
to treat the dividend as nontaxable and noncreditable to the
recipient corporation. If such an election is made, the TPA of
the distributing corporation will not be reduced as a result of
the distribution, nor will DWT be payable with respect to the
dividend, nor will the TPA of the receiving corporation be
increased as a result of the dividend, nor will the receiving
corporation include the dividend in gross income. The election
will be available only when the distributing corporation's TPA
balance is zero.
c. Dividends between affiliated corporations
filing consolidated returns will continue to be nontaxable, and a
parent corporation's basis in subsidiary stock will continue to
be adjusted for earnings of the subsidiary in accordance with the
consolidated return regulations. The TPA and DWT carryforward of
an affiliated group will be computed on a consolidated basis.

9. Exempt Investors. pp. 18, 163-164.
A new tax will be levied on the investment income
of exempt U.S. investors in corporate capital interests. DWT and
IWT will be fully creditable against this tax, and any excess
will be refundable. The tax base will include dividends and
interest received from U.S. corporations, and gains on the sale
of stock and debt in such corporations [as well as other
investment income] . The rate of this tax could be set at
different levels for different categories of exempt entities,
such as charities and pension funds.
10. Foreign Investors. pp. 19, 190-191.
a. A new foreign investor's tax (FIT) will be
levied on U.S. investment income of foreign investors. DWT will
be creditable by foreign investors against this tax, and any
excess will be refundable. The statutory rate of FIT should
equal the rate of DWT. The FIT will replace the current
withholding tax on foreign investors and will be subject to
mutual reduction in tax treaties. The tax base will include
interest and dividends paid by U.S. corporations and gains
realized on the sale of stock or debt or debt of U.S.
corporations [as well as other investment income].
b. Stock in a U.S. corporation previously held by
a foreign shareholder will not be eligible for shareholder
credits for a period of ten years in the absence of certification
that previous foreign shareholders have paid FIT on their gains.

11. Foreign Income. pp. 19, 198.
A U.S. corporation with foreign income will add to
the exempt income account described in Proposal 3(a) an amount
equal to its taxable foreign source income, reduced by the
associated creditable foreign taxes. That addition will be
limited to the foreign taxes multiplied by (l-c)/c, where c is
the U.S. corporate tax rate. The foregoing treatment will be
available only as part of a tax treaty.
12. Percentage of Integration. pp. 19-20, 209-210.
Transition to full conversion of the income tax
into a withholding tax could be accomplished by increasing the
"percentage of integration" from some initial amount over time to
100. At any given moment, the percentage of integration would
indicate the extent to which the additional burden of the
corporate tax had been eliminated by integration.
a. The following amounts will be multiplied by
the percentage of integration: (i) corporate taxes paid (before
addition to the TPA) ; (ii) corporate tax refunds (before
subtraction from the TPA; and (iii) foreign income net of foreign
taxes (before addition to the EIA)
.
b. The rate of DWT will be ic/ (1-c+ic) , where i
is the percentage of integration and c is the corporate tax rate.
c. The intercorporate dividends received
deduction will apply to a taxable dividend (including the DWT)
multiplied by [ (1-c) (1-i) ]/ (1-c+ic) . If the election provided
for in Proposal 8(b) is in effect, the amount included in taxable
8

income by the receiving corporation will be determined by
multiplying the dividend times (1-i) (1-d) where d is the
applicable percentage of the dividends received deduction under
section 243.
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